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Most images of yetis in Western popular culture and scholarly literature portray them as secular, 
predatory monsters.  These representations overlook important religious dimensions of yetis that 
are hidden in the current literature so I take a new look at yetis in Tibetan religions in order to 
clarify our understanding of these legendary creatures.  Following a phenomenological approach 
that sets aside the issue of the ontological existence of yetis I examine texts, art, ritual, and 
folklore in order to propose four yeti personal ideal types: the Buddhist practitioner, the human 
religious ally, the friendly yeti, and the mountain deity yeti.  These ideal types enhance earlier 
scholarship by demonstrating that yetis may appear in friendly as well as dangerous guises, may 
play religious roles even when they are not venerated, and may embody numinosity even when 






The Friendly Yeti 
 
One does not meet oneself until one catches the reflection from an eye other than human.  
– Loren Eiseley1 
 
Yetis in Cultural Imaginations 
Brian H. Hodgson, a British representative at the royal court in Kathmandu from 1820 to 1843, 
offered the first mention of yetis in the literature of the English-speaking world.  His Nepalese 
assistants told him of a ‘wild man’ who ‘moved, they said, erectly: was covered with long dark 
hair, and had no tail’ (Hodgson 1832: 339).  Major Lawrence A. Waddell added to the lore in 
1889 when he observed alleged yeti footprints (Shackley 1983: 52).  Around 1904 a British 
soldier named William Hugh Knight claimed to physically encounter a yeti near Gangtok, 
Sikkim.  In describing this yeti to The Times in 1921 Knight said, 
 
He was a little under six feet high, almost stark naked in that bitter cold -- it was 
the month of November.  He was a kind of pale yellow all over, about the colour 
of a Chinaman, a shock of matted hair on his head, little hair on his face, highly 
splayed feet, and large, formidable hands.  His muscular development in his arms, 
thighs, legs, back and chest were terrific.  He had in his hands what seemed to me 
to be some form of primitive bow.  He did not see me, but stood there, and I 
watched for some five or six minutes.  So far as I could make out, he was 
watching some man or beast far down the hillside.  At the end of some five 
minutes he started off on a run down the hill, and I was impressed with the 
tremendous speed at which he travelled (ibid.: 54). 
 
Western encounters with yetis continued when members of the Howard-Bury Everest 
expedition of 1921 found curious large human-like footprints in the snow at around 21,000 feet 
(ibid.: 52-53).  Their report prompted Henry Newman, a British writer for Kolkata’s The 
Statesman newspaper, to shape yeti tales into a story about a mysterious danger lurking in the 
Himalayas.  Misunderstanding the meaning of a Tibetan language appellation of this creature, 
miteh kangmi or ‘human-like bear of the snow,’ Newman unfortunately named this being ‘the 
abominable snowman’ (Sanderson 1968: 52; Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1975: 344). 
Ever since, recurrent images have appeared in American popular culture regarding so-
called ‘abominable snowmen.’  Perhaps because of the regrettable appearance of the word 
‘abominable’ in Newman’s description, the vast majority of these notions of yetis have depicted 
them as ferocious, predatory beasts.  From the 1964 animated Christmas special Rudolph the 
Red-nosed Reindeer, where a vicious yeti was partly tamed, to the bloodthirsty ogre of 2008's 
movie Yeti: Curse of the Snow Demon, popular culture characterizations portray yetis as huge 
brutes with superhuman strength and an opportunistic lust for human flesh.  Moreover, these 
yetis are considered to be devoid of religious relevance. 
                                                 




There have been some able academic studies of yetis from archaeology, zoology, 
primatology, and biology, such as those of Shackley (1983; 1994), Prince-Hughes (2001), 
Sanderson (1968), Napier (1973) and Stonor (1955).  Sadly these works ignore, understate, or 
misconstrue the religious dimensions of yetis and in so doing they misrepresent relevant data.  
The zoologist Ivan Sanderson, for example, misled a generation of scholars by arguing that yetis 
lack religious significance because they are not objects of worship (Sanderson 1968: 271-272), 
thereby overlooking other potential roles which yetis might play in Tibetan religions.  Even a 
sensitive scholar such as Myra Shackley described a ritual featuring a yeti as purely a Tibetan 
Bön ritual rather than as an Indian Tantric Buddhist ritual with Bön influences (Shackley 1983: 
59-60).  Only Halfdan Siiger (1978) provided a nuanced presentation of yetis as they appear in 
religion, but his presentation was largely limited to the non-Tibetan Rong people of Sikkim and 
so lacks relevance to our understanding of yetis in important Tibetan cultural realms.  On the 
whole the current academic literature does not possess a focused understanding of yetis in 
Tibetan religions.   
Thus many Western popular culture representations and scholarly explorations lack a 
careful and complete understanding of yetis in Tibetan religions.  Perhaps this is because both 
popular culture and academic presumptions may reflect the anthropocentrism prevalent in 
Western cultures (Noske 1997), which may occlude our understanding of non-human natural 
beings as religiously relevant and influential (Hobgood-Oster 2008) or as embodying sacredness 
(Shephard 1996).  If, therefore, we are to arrive at a coherent understanding of yetis in Tibetan 
religions, we must scrutinize the religious dimensions related to the perception and 
understanding of yetis. 
Fortunately for this task there are important alternative perspectives regarding yetis that 
remain latent in the literature.  Through a review of this literature from a phenomenological 
perspective we may shift hidden images of yetis in religion from the background to the 
foreground.  Looking anew at yetis affords awareness of them as amiable at times, religiously 
significant even when they are not venerated, and numinous in Otto’s (1958) sense when they are 
at their most terrifying. 
 My interest in this investigation, I wish to be clear from the outset, is in cultural 
representations of yetis rather than with the accuracy of claims regarding their existence or 
nonexistence.  Such claims should be verified by a zoologist, not a religion scholar.  Moreover, a 
phenomenological method requires an epoché or bracketing of ontological claims (Jackson 1996: 
6).  Furthermore, faithfulness to the perspectives of the residents of the Himalayas, some of 
whom consider yetis to be biological beings, while others consider them to be mythological ones 
(Bjonness 1986: 290), demands methodological agnosticism regarding their existence.  
 My exploration of the world of yetis in Tibetan religions will follow a phenomenological 
path as developed in the works of Alfred Schutz.  Schutz studied under Max Weber and retained 
many of his teacher’s approaches to sociological analysis, but he felt that Weber had never really 
clarified the concept of meaning in sociology.  From Schutz’s perspective, what Weber lacked 
was philosophical grounding, so Schutz turned to the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl in 
order to provide interpretive sociology with a solid theoretical footing. Schutz then recast 
Weberian concepts such as ideal types with greater clarity and explanatory power.  As described 
by Schutz, ideal types can be identified by taking a cross-section ‘of our experience of another 
person and, so to speak, “freezing it into a slide”’ (Schutz 1967: 187).  Sociological ideal types 
begin with a phenomenological perspective on behavior, resulting in ‘course-of-action’ ideal 




activity (ibid.).  Construction of a personal ideal type follows by postulating the existence of a 
person ‘whose actual living motive could be the objective context of meaning already chosen to 
define a typical action’ (ibid.: 189) as a heuristic for analyzing the appearances and deeds of 
social actors.   
However, a drawback of Schutz’s theory, and sadly many other social science theories, is 
that Schutz understands society purely in terms of human society. While this anthropocentrism of 
Schutz’s work largely remains implicit, we may discover a sense of it in his distinction between 
the ‘natural world’ and the ‘meaningful world’ (Schutz 1967: 218).  In understanding society as 
only a human phenomenon, his theory fails to account for important social interactions between 
human and nonhuman organisms. 
What Schutz failed to perceive was that nonhuman animals often participate in human 
social processes and, when they do, they should be included in any robust social analysis.  As 
scholars such as Midgeley (1978), Shepard (1996), Noske (1997), and Morris (1998, 2000) have 
shown, concepts of social action that exclude relevant nonhuman animals distort our knowledge 
of the world, including our knowledge of purely human life.  In terms of this study, yetis as 
reported by some humans appear to indicate or condition certain human lived social actions.  
Therefore an understanding of the culturally constituted behavioral environments (Hallowell 
1976: 358) of Tibetan religions requires an extension of Schutz’s notion of society to include, at 
least sometimes, nonhuman social beings such as yetis.  If the phenomenological study of society 
posits that ‘society is institutionalized as experience’ (Ferguson 2006: 160), then social 
experiences of beings such as yetis should be embraced within our concepts of society.   
Phenomenological anthropologist Michael Jackson (2002) offers a path out of this 
limitation of Schutz’s work through his study of human interactions with new technologies such 
as computers.  Jackson found that modern people typically anthropomorphize computers in a 
variety of ways, attributing to them positive feelings when things go well or malicious motives 
when they do not work properly, such that our interactions with computers mirror the ambiguity 
of ‘fulfillment and frustration’ inherent in human relationships (Jackson 2002: 335).  In other 
words, Jackson found that the same rules of social reciprocity that govern purely human 
relationships also appear, at least at times, in human interactions with computers.  On this basis 
humans may experience other beings as social intersubjective compatriots and consequently, we 
should expand our phenomenological understanding of society to include, ‘persons, animals, 
gods, spirits, material things, and technologies’ (ibid.).  As we will see, the folklore of yetis also 
involves similar ambiguous relationships of ‘fulfillment and frustration,’ so it is appropriate to 
expand our understanding of the phenomenology of Tibetan society to include the presence of 
yetis.  Following Jackson allows us to understand yetis as nonhuman social actors, or ‘persons’ 
in Hallowell’s sense (1976: 359), and thereby to construct Schutzian personal ideal types of 
yetis.  
In my own analysis I deploy Schutz’s approach to ideal types to illuminate the 
appearances of yetis in their Himalayan homeland. In a way resembling how Schutz described 
personal ideal types such as ‘woodcutter,’ ‘miser,’ or ‘police officer’ in trying to grasp 
phenomena ‘in their nakedness, just as they are’ (Ferguson 2006: 161), I have perceived four 
ideal types of yetis: ‘the practicing Buddhist,’ ‘the human religious ally,’ ‘the friendly yeti,’ and 





Yetis in the lore of Asian mountain peoples  
Yeti-like beings appear in the lore of many Asian mountain peoples over a vast area from 
Sichuan in China to the eastern Himalayas in Bhutan, and from there westward along the 
Himalayas all the way to the Pamirs, so there are many names for and understandings of this 
mysterious creature.  The word ‘yeti’ itself comes from the Sherpa dialect of the Tibetan 
language.  Sherpas live in eastern Nepal, having migrated there from Tibet in the late fifteenth 
and early sixteenth centuries, so they are in many ways ethnically, culturally, and linguistically 
Tibetan (Ortner 1989: 4).  ‘Yeti’ derives from the Sherpa word yeh teh (g.ya dred)2 (Snellgrove 
1995: 214), or ‘cliff-dwelling bear.’  As such, Sherpas recognize two kinds of yetis.  The larger 
species of yeti, the dzu teh or ‘livestock bear,’ walks only on all four legs and preys on livestock 
such as goats, cattle, and yaks (Shackley 1983: 52).  According to biologist Charles Stonor, this 
is the Himalayan red bear (Ursus arctos isabellinus) and Sherpas recognize it as such (Stonor 
1955: 64).  The smaller of the two yeti species is the mi teh or meh teh (mi dred), or ‘human-
bear.’  Many Sherpas have shown that they can easily recognize bears but insist that that the 
bipedal mi teh yeti, unlike the dzu teh, is not a bear but rather is a unique species (ibid.: 158).  It 
is the mi teh yeti which appears in the Buddhist temple adornments, religious thangka painted 
scrolls, and the stories I describe presently.  Non-Sherpa Nepalis might call the yeti banmanche3 
(ibid.: 26), nyalmo, teh-lma, or ban jhankri (Peters 2004). 
In central Tibet one finds the creature called ‘migö’ (mi rgod), ‘wild human,’ more 
commonly than ‘yeti’ (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1957: 157).  Other Tibetan names include kang mi, 
‘snow man’; mi shompo, ‘strong man’; or mi chenpo, ‘big man’ (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1975: 
344).  Many Tibetans say that yeti footprints resemble those of the teh mong (dred mong) or mi 
teh (mi dred), which in Tibet is the Himalayan brown bear (Ursus arctos), and sometimes in 
Tibet the yeti is called mi teh kang mi (Shackley 1983: 52; Stonor 1955: 5), ‘human-like bear of 
the snow.’  All of these appellations appear to imply some closeness with humans through the 
use of the term mi, which denotes a human being.  
Since at least the eighteenth century and likely much longer, many Himalayan peoples 
have understood yetis as real creatures (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1957: 158; Vlček 1959) and yeti 
reports have continued into the twenty-first century. Tibetan cultural images describe yetis as 
ape-like rather than bear-like, with long arms, a powerful torso, a conical head, and a body 
covered in long brown or reddish hair (Shackley 1983: 62; Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1957: 160).  The 
hairless face of a yeti has a flat nose, like a primate, rather than the protruding nose of a bear 
(Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1957: 160; Stonor 1955: 45).4  A yeti may move on either two or four legs 
depending on the ease of journey (Shackley 1983: 62; Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1957: 160).   
                                                 
2 This essay seeks to be accessible to non-specialists yet still relevant to specialists.  However, 
most non-specialists find it difficult to pronounce many Tibetan words transliterated into the 
Wylie scholarly standard.  Therefore I will give phonetic renderings of Tibetan terms and, when 
necessary, offer the Wylie transliteration in following parentheses. 
3 In Nepalese folklore a banmanche or  ‘man of the forest’, regarded in different areas as human 
or perhaps some human-ape hybrid, is a creature whose features may or may not resemble those 
of the yeti as described here (Stonor 1955; Peters 2004). 
4 The ape-like description of yetis is remarkable given that there are no known species of large 
nonhuman primates high in the Himalayas (Schaller 1998).  Equally remarkable are the 
Himalayan residents who insist that yetis do not have protruding noses like bears despite the 




Contrary to many American popular culture sketches, yetis are thought not to live in the 
high altitude snows but rather in the alpine forests just below the snow line.  During winter they 
move to lower altitudes and nearer to human settlements (Shackley 1983: 63; Nebesky-
Wojkowitz 1957: 160; Stonor 1955: 45), but they may travel across high altitude snowfields to 
move to a different valley or to feed on the saline mosses of the glaciers (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 
1957: 160).  Along with these mosses, yetis are thought to feed on frogs (Sanderson 1968: 277) 
and pikas (Shackley 1983: 63; Stonor 1955), the abundant small mouse-hares found widely in 
the Himalayas. They also are said to steal food from humans (Sanderson 1968: 271). 
Yetis are rarely seen and believed to be nocturnal; some Bhutanese believe that yetis 
possess a small talisman called a dipshing which can even render them invisible (Choden 1997: 
x-xi).  Yetis are more often heard, as they emit a distinctive high-pitched screech or whistling 
sound (Shackley 1983: 62; Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1957: 160).  Some aver that yetis possess their 
own language and females are the leaders of yeti groups (Nath and Gupta 1994: 100-101). 
 
Liminal yetis 
If we are to understand the religious dimensions of yetis we must first appreciate their 
constitutions as liminally neither human nor nonhuman animals.  For instance, the Mani Kabum 
(mani bka’ bum), an important twelfth century religio-historical chronicle of Tibet, exemplifies 
shared kinship between humans and yetis.  According to the Mani Kabum, Tibet was once a 
giant lake that receded, leaving behind forests, animals, and mountains.  The Tibetan people 
were born on one of these mountains bordering the Yarlung valley.  This mountain was inhabited 
by a sinmo (srin mo), a female rock ogress, who was an incarnation of the Buddhist deity of 
mercy Drolma (sgrol ma).  The ogress met a monkey, who was an incarnation of the Buddhist 
deity of compassion Chenrezig (spyan ras gzigs), and the two mated.  They produced six hybrid 
monkey-human children who became the ancestors of the original six Tibetan clans.  The 
monkey-humans were short and covered with hair, possessed flat red faces, stood erect, and 
perhaps had tails (Stein 1972: 46).  Over generations the progeny of the six clan ancestors 
evolved, becoming less simian and more human, until they developed into the Tibetan people.  
According to Tibetan oral lore, however, some of these early ancestors did not evolve fully into 
humans and remained hirsute ‘wild people’ (mi rgod) (ibid.: 28), or yetis (Peters 2004: 30-31).  
The precise stage of the limited evolution reached by these yetis remains unclear.  Nonetheless, 
in this story yetis and humans stand apart from the rest of the natural world in terms of origin and 
biology, as they share ancestry and differ only in historical evolution.  Yetis are unlike other 
nonhuman animals, as they share ancestral kinship with humans, but yetis are not fully human, 
either.  In the Mani Kabum yetis reside in an ambiguous liminal space, being neither human nor 
nonhuman animal. 
 This understanding of the liminal nature of yetis is affirmed in Tibetan sacred art and 
temple architecture.  In Tibetan Buddhism, some kyilkhors (dkyil 'khor), which are elaborate 
meditational artworks, and thangka religious paintings in Buddhist temples clearly depict a yeti 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1955: 30, 34, 54) tells of showing photos of primates and bears to Tibetans and each time 
Tibetans identified orangutans, not bears, with yetis.  He further indicates that yetis are seen in 
winter, when bears are hibernating (ibid.: 158).  Nonetheless Messner (2000) concluded that the 
legend of yetis results from mistaken bear sightings.  Meldrum (2006) concurred with Messner 




rebirth as lower than a human rebirth but higher than and separate from other animal rebirths 
(Shackley 1983: 60).  This view is somewhat heterodox, as Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna Buddhist 
texts recognize six gatis or realms of rebirth: gods, demi-gods, humans, animals, pretas, and 
hells. In the Buddhist textual standard derived from India, there is no intermediate realm between 
the human realm and the animal realm.  Nonetheless, many pieces of Tibetan temple art, 
sometimes in mainline monasteries, delineate a ‘yeti realm’ precisely as intermediate between 
humans and animals, perhaps reflecting the ancestral human-yeti special kinship described by the 
Mani Kabum.   
The mountaineer Reinhold Messner provides an example of such liminality in a story 
from a visit to Bhutan (Messner 2000: 98-101).  While there, Messner visited Gangtey 
Monastery, where there was a room with a wall covered with the stuffed heads of deceased 
animals.  One may commonly find such animal heads in Tibetan monasteries to lend natural 
sacred powers to a religious spot.  Of interest in Gangtey Monastery, however, was the position 
of the supposed yeti head in the display in a place of prominence above the heads of animals 
such as boars, tigers, and sheep.  The religious leaders of the monastery confirmed that this is 
because a yeti rebirth ranks higher than an animal rebirth.  This alleged yeti head blurs the 
boundary between human and nonhuman animals in a liminal way5.   
 
Yetis in action 
Recognition of the human side of the liminal natures of yetis in Himalayan cultural imagery 
leads us to appreciate the surprising ability of yetis to practice the Buddhist religion.  Generally 
speaking, Buddhism considers nonhuman animals to lack the ability to practice religion because 
animals lack the reflective capacity to realize enlightenment.  As such, animals ordinarily cannot 
be ordained within the Buddhist monastic sangha community and Buddhism considers animals 
incapable of acts of religious devotion (Harris 2006: 208).6  In most Buddhist thought, only 
human beings can practice Buddhism.  In Tibetan lifeworlds, however, the liminal natures of 
yetis allow them to participate in degrees of humanness, including in this case the human 
practice of the Buddhist religion.  While not all Tibetans will agree that yetis can be Buddhists, 
there are numerous cultural testimonies that they can. 
                                                 
5 Messner considered this yeti head to be fabricated.  The famous yeti scalp from Khumjung 
Gompa in Nepal was shown by Western scientists to be formed from the skins of serow 
antelopes which had been sewn together (Hillary 2000: 197).  The yeti hand of Pangboche 
Gompa was described as antelope and human bones which had been wired together.  Of course, 
for some Himalayan people, if an article functions ritually as a yeti scalp, it is a yeti scalp, 
regardless of Western perspectives.  An object fabricated centuries ago to encourage religious 
belief may have its origins forgotten and now appear to people as old, traditional, and therefore 
‘real.’  In the words of David Chidester, yeti artifacts may enact ‘authentic religious work’ even 
if they are ‘religious fakes’ (Chidester 2005: vii). 
6 Trees famously have been ordained by Thai monks and there are other instances in which 
animals and plants have been admitted into the Buddhist monastic sangha.  But these ordinations 
often are not accepted as valid in all parts of the Buddhist monastic community because one 
question which must be answered affirmatively in the ordination process is, ‘Are you a human 




 Stories from the life of the great seventeenth century Sherpa religious leader Lama 
Sangwa Dorje (gsang ba rdo rje), for example, indicate that yetis may participate in Buddhism in 
significant measure.  As a youth Sangwa Dorje left Sherpa country to study Buddhism in 
southern Tibet, where he became skilled in practice and was recognized as the fifth incarnation 
of the spiritual teacher of Rongphu Monastery (Snellgrove 1995: 213).  He returned to the 
Sherpa Khumbu region with the resolve to found monasteries.  Seeking guidance from his 
tutelary deity Gombu (mgon po), he meditated in a retreat cave near Pangboche (Ortner 1989: 
52).  In Tibetan Buddhist areas, people typically revere meditating hermits like Sangwa Dorje 
and, as a sign of religious devotion, freely offer them food and water in support of their retreats.  
In this case, it was a yeti who cared for Sangwa Dorje (Snellgrove 1995: 214).  The yeti regularly 
brought Sangwa Dorje food, water, and fuel, and even became his Buddhist disciple (Wangmo 
2008: 124).  When the yeti died, Sangwa Dorje retained the alleged scalp of the yeti and this 
scalp and a supposed yeti hand remained in Pangboche Gompa, the monastery founded around 
the year 1667 by Sangwa Dorje.  For centuries afterwards, the Drogon lamas, who are successors 
to Sangwa Dorje’s leadership, periodically would parade the yeti scalp around the village in a 
fertility ritual7 to bless the people, animals, houses, and fields, a practice which continued until 
the lineage of the Drogon lamas recently moved to India (ibid.: 125).  The yeti hand was housed 
as a sacred relic of the monastery until it was stolen in 1999. 
 As remarkable as it is to think that yetis can be Buddhist practitioners, the story of 
Sangwa Dorje is not isolated and other notions of religious yetis exist. Kunsang Choden, for 
example, recounts a Bhutanese tale in which a group of yetis serve as Buddhist shrine attendants 
(Choden 1997: 137-139).  In the dead of night and away from the prying eyes of humans, a small 
group of yetis maintained a village temple devoted to the protective deity Panden Lhamo (dpal 
ldan lha mo).  Each night the yetis would arrive, clean and refill the offering bowls on the altar, 
replenish the butter in temple butter lamps, and then disappear before sunrise.  Like the yeti in 
the story of Lama Sangwa Dorje, these yetis perform Buddhist bodhisattva8 deeds and acts of 
Buddhist devotion in ways very similar Tibetans.   
In the prior stories, we saw yetis behave like nice, pacific Buddhist bodhisattvas.  These 
yetis are kinder and gentler, which is why some Tibetans told both Charles Stonor and René de 
Nebesky-Wojkowitz that yetis are placid and not to be feared unless injured (Stonor 1955: 64, 
91; Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1957: 160).  In Tibetan art, some renderings of yetis in Tibetan temples, 
such as at the Norbulinka Institute in Dharamsala, India, depict smiling, jolly, human-like 
creatures.  What we see with these yetis is that, contrary to the dominant Western conceptions of 
yetis as fierce monsters, yetis actually can appear as well-behaved Buddhist practitioners.  These 
stories offer us an alternative understanding of yetis that includes religious practice and amiable 
behavior. 
 In other stories yetis do not behave as Buddhist practitioners but as religious allies of 
humans.  One such story tells of a yeti who exhibits the Buddhist virtue of gratitude, although 
perhaps in a less human and less peaceful way than that of our yeti temple attendants.  This story 
is quite common, possessing several variants across Himalayan communities.  In this story, a 
Tibetan Buddhist meditator, or yogi, wandered through the mountains.  Then, 
                                                 
7 The ritual use of yeti body parts is also found in prescriptions for Bön magical potions which 
use yeti blood (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1975: 344). 
8
 A bodhisattva is a saintly figure in Buddhism who compassionately works to alleviate suffering 





One day he was crippled by an attack of gout and was unable to walk.  He 
established himself in a pleasant place at the edge of the forest where he found 
some goats, who eventually followed him everywhere like pets.  There he 
remained. 
 On the other side of the hill were some abandoned shacks.  Every day he 
would see a huge dark man coming and going between the shacks and the river.  
Apart from this, there was no other sign of life. 
 One week he no longer noticed his strange neighbor on his daily walk.  
Having become intrigued by that mysterious man and feeling a bit better, the yogi 
decided to investigate the man’s dilapidated dwelling. 
 Inside, the yogi was startled to come face to face with a migö, or wild 
man, as Tibetans call the yeti.  The hirsute behemoth was lying outstretched on 
the floor, eyes closed and fangs apart, seemingly unaware of the intrusion.  He 
was feverish and obviously ill. 
 One of the yeti’s feet was grossly swollen and full of pus.  The yogi 
immediately noticed, protruding from the infected area of that vast foot, a sharp 
splinter of wood that could easily be removed.  He thought, ‘I know he can jump 
up and devour me at any moment, but now that I have come this far I might as 
well try to help the poor creature.’ 
 While he gently extracted the long splinter, the yeti—aware that the lama 
was helping him—lay as still as a patient etherized upon an operating table.  The 
kindly yogi cautiously cleaned away the pus.  He washed the wound, using his 
own saliva as a salve; then he bandaged the bizarre foot with a rag torn from his 
own clothing. 
 On tiptoe he left the yeti, returning to his goats, which were tied to a tree 
in the forest.  Days afterward, he saw the yeti limping down to the river, 
presumably for water, and then slowly returning to his house.  Eventually the 
creature’s gait improved to the point where he could walk without difficulty.  
Miraculously enough, the yogi’s crippling gout also began to subside so that his 
painful stride began to return to normal, until he, too, was completely cured.  
After that, he no longer saw the yeti. 
 One day the ferocious yeti suddenly leapt down like a giant gorilla from 
the trees, grimaced at the yogi, then sprang back into the trees and was gone.  A 
few days later the same thing happened—but this time the yeti was carrying a 
dead tiger on his shoulder.  Placing the magnificent carcass in front of the lama as 
if in a token of his gratitude, he again bounded off into the dense jungle. 
 The yogi did not wish to eat the meat, but he skinned the beautiful beast 
with meticulous care.  Eventually, upon his return to the Shechen Monastery, he 
offered the splendid tiger skin to the monastery for use during tantric rites (Das 
1992: 229-231). 
 
The grateful yeti in this story acted as a religious ally of the yogi by providing material 
support for the yogi’s Buddhist practice.  In Sherpa country we find another yeti who also acts as 
a religious ally of humans by providing both a protective function and a function as a scapegoat.  




Sangwa Dorje (Ortner 1989: 49).  During the Dumche ceremonies a figure called a gyamakag 
(rgya dmag ‘gag or rgya ma kag) guards the monastery entrance.  The gyamakag is a human 
who ‘represents a yeti and his role is to scare away evil spirits, who are said to be extremely 
afraid of yetis’ (Wangmo 2008: 162).  In this performance as a yeti the gyamakag wears the 
conical yeti scalp kept at the monastery, a sheepskin coat turned with the fur on the outside, and 
has his face painted black (ibid.: 173).   
However, this yeti is more than a gatekeeper since the gyamakag also performs an 
important ancillary function.  According to Jamyang Wangmo (2008: 171), on the second day of 
the Dumche ritual lamas prepare a special lokpar torma, a dough effigy (gtor ma) of the type that 
is often used in Tibetan Buddhist rituals.  The lokpar torma, however, differs from other 
offertory effigies.  Intended as an exorcism glud or scapegoat, it alone consists of buckwheat 
flour, rather than barley flour; bears red and black paint; and contains representations of hellish 
flames as well as miniature models of human skulls.  During the sixth day of the Dumche 
ceremony, lamas chant the ritual of the Red Wrathful Guru (gu ru drag dmar), during which the 
lokpar torma is infused with the sins and evil spirits that might afflict the village (ibid.).  In the 
past another effigy in the shape of a human also received the community’s sins as a part of the 
exorcism process (Fürer-Haimendorf 1964: 202).   
After a series of sacred ‘cham dances in the monastery courtyard, the gyamakag, armed 
with a sword, leads a procession out of the monastery to a pit outside of the village, all the while 
chanting loudly, ‘Ho! Ho!’ (Wangmo 2008: 173).  The yeti gyamakag, still donning the yeti 
scalp, wears a mask over his mouth to protect him from inhaling evil as he carries the lokpar 
torma to the pit.  The lokpar torma, bearing the weight of the community’s harmful energies, is 
placed in the pit, and the people throw stones at the dough scapegoat figure while the gyamakag 
stabs it with his sword.  By wielding the sword the gyamakag, rather than the lamas and people 
of the community, takes on the negative karma from killing the demons trapped in the torma, 
making his ritual role as a secondary human-yeti scapegoat an unpopular one.  While the 
gyamakag kills the effigy-bound demons, lamas chant invocations to beneficent lha gods for help 
in vanquishing the evil forces trapped in the dough figure.  Then they burn the effigy, banishing 
its negative energy.  Afterwards the people return to the monastery complex for more sacred 
dances and other festivities (ibid.).  As we see, in this ritual the gyamakag-as-yeti acts in alliance 
with humans by performing an essential, if negatively tinged, role in the exorcism ceremony.  
 
Numinous yetis 
In other manifestations yetis act in religious alliance with humans but in more numinous forms. 
Myra Shackley (1994), for example, describes how a mi teh yeti, this time explicitly understood 
as a numinous nonhuman animal, performs a positive, protective ritual function at a Tibetan 
Buddhist ritual in the Himalayan region of Lo Manthang.  Annually the Tibetan Buddhist 
Sakyapa monastery of Ngon-Ga Janghub Ling Monthang Choedhe (sic) hosts a five-day Deje 
ritual to drive out demons, these demons understood both as physical forces and as inner 
impediments to enlightenment.   The ritual features a slew of religious ‘cham dances in which 
the central figure is the Tibetan Buddhist deity Dorje Purba (rdo rje phur ba).  At the end of the 
ritual drama Dorje Purba embodies the power to slay a major demon because of the help of 
dancing monks dressed as the deity’s four sacred animal protectors: a tiger, a wolf, a snow 
leopard, and a mi teh yeti.  Rather than being a central, venerated deity, here the yeti is a 




disperse negative forces from the community, this yeti represents a divine religious ally who is 
pacific towards humans.   
Typifications of yetis who behave peacefully toward humans but perhaps violently 
toward other beings are common, but not all divine yetis are benign towards humans. Western 
cultural portrayals of yetis as monsters, while not fully representative of Tibetan understandings, 
do not arise in a vacuum.  Yetis are sometimes dangerous to humans but the most threatening 
may also be the most divine, emerging as incarnations of mountain deities in the context of 
Himalayan folk religion.   
Many Himalayan people consider a great mountain in their vicinity to be the abode of 
their local yul lha, or ‘locality deity.’  In fact, in Tibetan folk belief great mountains are deities 
who happen to appear as mountains.  Such yul lha deities reward the local community for good 
behavior and discipline it for negative behavior, thus keeping order in social groups through 
various taboos and restrictions.  It is widely thought that a displeased yul lha will distribute 
punishment by sending out an emanation, a physical embodiment of the deity, in the guise of a 
strong ape-like yeti (Snellgrove 1995: 314; Stonor 1955: 172; Bjonness 1986: 290).  This 
mountain deity yeti, identified by Snellgrove (1995: 314; cf. Hodgson 1832: 339) as a 
continuation of the raksha (Tibetan gnod sbyin) of Indian Hindu and Buddhist myth, enforces 
discipline by bringing illness, property damage such as crop destruction or depredation of 
livestock, or human death.  This is why among the many Buddhist artworks of the revered 
Drepung Monastery in Lhasa, Tibet, one finds a mural painting of a numinous she-yeti carrying a 
decapitated human corpse.   
Because mountain deity yetis function as keepers of community order, Himalayan people 
frequently regard hearing or seeing a yeti as a bad omen and some mountain dwellers may seek 
the aid of a Buddhist leader to dispel negative forces and accumulate merit if they have 
encountered a yeti (Stonor 1955: 97-98; Snellgrove 1995: 314).  Further, because some yetis are 
deities, it is said that yetis should not be photographed and a yeti may kill a photographer who 
violates this taboo (Nath and Gupta 1994: 62).  Of interest, Western popular cultural notions of 
yetis typically delineate secular beasts devoid of religious elements, whereas these yetis, like 
some Native American characterizations of sasquatch (Meldrum 2006: 73-86), represent 
powerful manifest deities, hierophanies of the sacred in Eliade’s (1958) terms. 
 We find a specific example of a dangerous divine yeti’s mandating community order at a 
pilgrimage site in Tibet, according to Tibetologist Toni Huber (1999).  Dakpa Sheri is a high 
Himalayan peak that has long been one of the most popular destinations for Tibetan Buddhist 
pilgrims.  Following Tibetan tradition, pilgrims worship the deity of the mountain, Korlo Dompa 
(‘khor lo sdom pa), through the practice of korra or circumambulation.  Protocol at Dakpa Sheri 
forbids women on the uppermost circumambulation paths as they instead are required to follow a 
defined female-only route.  One day a woman wished to challenge this gender discrimination and 
defied the restrictions by dressing as a man.  She completed a korra circuit reserved for men and 
then openly gloated about her accomplishment.  After nightfall a yeti abducted her, split open a 
tree, and then sealed her inside.  The yeti did so because he was an incarnation of the local shing 
kyong (zhing skyong), or protective deity, and it was his job to enforce the sacred restrictions 
(Huber 1999: 122).  As at Lo Manthang, this yeti is not a central, venerated deity yet it still 






Conclusion: Four types of yetis 
From the standpoint of phenomenological religious studies, while some yetis are ferocious, as 
previously thought in the West, others are amiable. But apart from this, I think four main types of 
yetis can be identified in Tibetan religions: practicing Buddhist yetis, yetis who are religious 
allies of humans, friendly yetis, and mountain deity yetis.   
Buddhist yetis are pious and not dangerous to humans, arising as patrons of Buddhist 
saints, disciples of Buddhist masters, and bodhisattva temple attendants.  Human religious ally 
yetis are friendly and nonviolent towards humans but not necessarily to other beings. They 
emerge as spiritual friends in the wild, as animal protectors in religious dance rituals, as 
gatekeepers, and as scapegoats.  Some but not all human ally yetis are numinous.  Sometimes the 
practicing Buddhist type shares characteristics with the human religious ally ideal type, yielding 
a third possibility, that of the friendly yeti.9  Finally, there are the mountain deity yetis, who are 
aggressive and dangerous toward humans and other beings.  An understanding of these yetis as 
ferocious is shared in some Western and Tibetan perceptions, but even these latter yetis are 
numinous in the Himalayas, in contrast to the purely secular creatures of the Western popular 
imagination.   
Delineating these types provides alternative perspectives to the scholarly study of yetis.  
They reveal that, contrary to findings such as those of Sanderson (1968), yetis play religious 
roles even when they are not specifically venerated, they are sometimes numinous, and some 
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